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Introduction. My thesis is summarized in my title, ‘No 
God, No Laws’: the concept of a law of Nature cannot be 
made sense of without God. It is not as dramatic a thesis as 
it might look, however. I do not mean to argue that the 
enterprise of modern science cannot be made sense of 
without God. Rather, if you want to make sense of it you 
had better not think of science as discovering laws of 
Nature, for there cannot be any of these without God. That 
depends of course on what we mean by ‘laws of  Nature’. 
Whatever else we mean, I take it that this much is essential: 
Laws of Nature are prescriptive, not merely descriptive, 
and – even stronger –  they are supposed to be responsible 
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for what occurs in Nature. Since at least the Scientific 
Revolution they are also supposed to be visible in the Book 
of Nature, not writ only on stone tablets nor in the thought 
of God.  
 
My claim here is that neither of these features can be made 
sense of without God; this despite the fact that they are 
generally thought to provide some autonomy of the world 
order from God. I will focus on recent accounts of laws of 
Nature and describe how the dominant ones fail without the 
efforts  of God; I shall also outline one alternative that tries 
to make sense of the order of Nature and the successes of 
modern science without laws of Nature and without 
immediate reliance on God. 
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Empiricism. The most dominant view of laws of Nature in 
contemporary Anglophone philosophy of science is 
empiricism, which takes its starting position from David 
Hume. Empiricists suppose that there is no such thing as 
necessity in the empirical world, apart from logical 
necessity. Nothing in the empirical world makes anything 
happen. Nature is just a collection of events, one after 
another.  
 
There are, as it turns out, regular associations among these 
events – the force experienced by an object is regularly 
equal to its mass times its acceleration; these are the facts 
recorded in what we call ‘laws’ in science. This doctrine 
can thus provide a sense to the idea that laws are writ in the 
Book of Nature: laws are regularities that occur in Nature. 
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The problem, I shall point out, is that there is no way in 
which these laws can be said to govern events in Nature.  
 
There are three decreasingly strict versions of the empiricist 
approach to laws of Nature: 
 
1. egalitarian empiricism: all regularities are equal. 
2. class-ordered empiricism: some regularities have a 
higher status than others; these we call ‘laws’. What 
makes for high status in a regularity? There are two 
chief candidates on offer. The first is that high-status 
regularities should have universal scope: f=ma 
universally whereas All the coins in my pocket are 
British has a very narrow scope. The second, which is 
very popular, is that the high-status regularities are 
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those that simultaneously maximize simplicity of 
expression with breadth of coverage. 
3. blue-blood empiricism: it is not just that some 
regularities have more of something – like breadth of 
scope or simplicity; some are qualitatively better in 
that they hold necessarily. How can such a view label 
itself ‘empiricist’? You will understand one reason for 
this when see we how much more radically 
unempiricist the next alternative is. A second reason is 
in the kinds of accounts of necessity on offer. What 
seems to be important for empiricists of this stripe is 
to avoid the idea that anything in Nature makes 
anything else happen; Hume after all taught that we 
find no such thing in our experience of the world. The 
favoured account is that necessary regularities are 
those that not only hold, but would continue to hold 
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were their antecedents brought about in arbitrary 
ways.(So, ‘All the coins in my pocket are British’ does 
not hold necessarily. If I were to put the coins in my 
pocket that I got in change from my gelato, the 
regularity would break down.)  
 
I think that this last view cannot be carried off. There is 
no fact of the matter about what would happen if this 
heavy body were released without further non-Humean 
facts like the earth has the power to make heavy bodies 
fall. That, however, is not the primary objection of 
relevance here. What matters for my arguments about 
God and the laws of |Nature is that the laws we get even 
from blue-blood empiricism cannot govern.  
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What after all is a law on this view? It is a regularity, 
albeit a very special kind of regularity. And a regularity 
is just a collection of paired events: B follows A once, B 
follows A again, it does so again, and again and … It 
doesn’t matter in what mode the regularity occurs, 
whether for instance this kind of pattern would continue 
to obtain if A were to occur in different circumstances or 
in different possible worlds. A regularity is just a 
collection of paired events and a collection does not 
make any of its members happen. This would still be true 
even if we could find some stronger sense of necessary 
to characterize the special collections we call ‘laws’. So 
long as laws are collections of happenings, there is no 
sense in which they can be taken to be responsible for 
what happens. 
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In a sense empiricists admit this. Their project has not 
been to salvage laws but rather to salvage empiricism in 
the face of the structure of modern science. Clearly some 
things are privileged by modern science: the equations of 
quantum field theory or of the general theory of 
relativity. Empiricists have to make sense of this given 
their view that Nature is just made up of one event 
succeeding another, succeeding another, … Their view is 
tailored to achieve this: the ‘laws’ and equations of 
science refer to regularities and the regularities that get 
represented as laws are the high-class ones, by whatever 
the favoured criterion for class is. 
 
What you cannot do on any of these empiricist accounts 
is to find something in the empirical world that governs, 
i.e. a law of nature. To that extent these three accounts 
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are self-consistent: empiricism rejects governance as a 
feature of the empirical world and governance does not 
sneak in the back door in the reconstruction of laws as 
classy or blue-blood regularities.  
 
This does not, though, make these empiricisms 
inconsistent with governance, tout court. In its origins in 
the Scientific Revolution modern empiricism was neither 
conceived nor intended to be at odds with governance. 
Laws were God’s plans: the blueprints according to 
which God makes things happen. They are visible in the 
Book of Nature in the way in which an architect’s plan is 
visible in the finished building or the laws of a good 
society are visible in its functioning. Without God, 
however, God’s plans and God’s will, there can be no 
laws of Nature for an empiricist. There is no other 
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account on offer that provides empiricist science with 
laws of Nature. 
 
Platonism. The second most dominant view of laws of 
Nature in contemporary Anglophone philosophy is 
Platonism. Platonists believe in abstract entities, for 
instance mathematical objects (like numbers) or 
properties or quantities. Versions of Platonism differ 
according to whether all these abstract entities have to 
appear in concrete objects and events or not. Laws of 
Nature are relations among abstract entities like the 
quantity force, the quantity mass and the quantity 
acceleration. This contrasts with the regularity account, 
which looks for laws in relations not among the abstract 
entities but among the concrete events in Nature in 
which these abstract entities participate.  
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 Platonisits’ laws are necessary because it is part of the 
essence of the abstract entities that they relate in the 
specified way: if they did not, they would not be the 
abstract entities that they are. This solves the blue-blood 
problem for regularities. ‘F=ma’ is a blue-blood 
regularity appropriate to figure in science because the 
abstract quantities force, mass and acceleration must 
relate in the way we record in ‘f=ma’, otherwise they 
would not be the very quantities they are.  All the coins 
in my pocket is not because being British  is no part of 
the essence of the abstract property composed of being a 
coin and being in my pocket.  
 
Suppose we accept all this. It still does not provide us 
with laws of Nature. The best it  does is to solve the 
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problem the empiricists aimed to solve: to explain why 
some regularities are better than others. The high-class 
ones, the scientific ones, are the ones whose properties 
(recall, properties as abstract entities) are related to one 
another. But how do these relations among abstract 
entities govern events in the empirical world? 
 
The idea seems to be that if abstract properties bear a 
certain second-level abstract relation to each other in the 
Platonic realm, then the systems that instantiate those 
properties will be related in some ‘corresponding’ way1 
in the empirical world. But what makes that true? We 
could say, “That is just what we mean by claiming that 
the corresponding properties are related.”  
 
                                                 
1 That is, they will be related in some way that corresponds to the second-level abstract relation. 
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The problem is that we cannot just say this. We have 
already fixed what we mean by saying that the properties 
relate in that way: it is part of the essence of the 
properties that they do so. And we did this for good 
reason: to solve the blue-blood problem. Now we need 
some account of why when abstract properties relate in 
the way they must given what they are, the systems that 
instantiate them relate in some corresponding way. In 
fact we need more than that. For we not only want the 
relations in the empirical world to hold whenever the 
abstract ones do; we also want the fact that the abstract 
relations hold to be what makes the empirical relations 
hold. That story is lacking.2 
 
                                                 
2 I think this point is similar to that made by Bas Van Fraassen in 'Laws and Symmetry', that accounts of 
laws of nature must overcome two problems, the problem of inference and the problem of identification.  
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Worse, I don’t think there is any story that can be told. 
Abstract relations are not the kinds of things that can 
make other things happen; they are not the kinds of 
things that have powers. There is nothing internal to the 
relations themselves that can do the job. If these Platonic 
relations are to figure in an account of what makes things 
happen in the empirical world, some outside force is 
required to make them relevant. They may serve as 
God’s blueprints for what he brings about in the world, 
but they cannot bring about things themselves. What 
Platonists call ‘laws’ as well as what empiricists call 
‘laws’ need God and his direct control of the world if 
these are to be laws at all.  
 
Instrumentalism. Instrumentalists give up on laws of 
Nature altogether. The ‘laws’ and equations of science 
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are considered as instruments or tools for making very 
precise predictions, for building things, for making new 
discoveries. These ‘laws’ need not fit together in any tidy 
way. They can be at different ‘levels’ of description, use 
different mathematics and different concepts, cover 
different kinds of things and even leave a lot uncovered. 
 
I like instrumentalism because of the second feature of 
laws which we have not focussed on yet: laws are to be 
visible in the Book of Nature. The usual meaning of this 
is that the laws are reflected in the regularities of Nature. 
But I am sceptical that the right kinds of regularities are 
there. We certainly do not see them. Most of our ‘laws’ 
have sweeping exceptions; we could not even hope to 
see them obtain except in very special circumstances – 
mostly inside the laboratory or in some specially 
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felicitous natural arrangements like the planetary 
systems. 
 
Often we are told that despite appearances the 
regularities really do obtain. Where? “Behind” the 
phenomena, or perhaps “inside”. But these are 
metaphors. There isn’t any front and behind to the 
phenomena, any surfaces and insides. Things in the 
empirical world do have components. Because of our 
failure to make sense of regularities holding ‘behind’ the 
phenomena we have been driven to rely on the notion of 
components.  
 
Large things may not behave in properly regular ways, 
but their components do…or the components of the 
components, or… In the end at last we reach the 
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fundamental particles. These do behave regularly – or so 
we say. In the end the only genuine laws of Nature then 
are the laws of the physics of fundamental particles.  I 
am suspicious of all this. Why are these very central 
regularities all just where we cannot see them? By 
contrast, the one regularity I am really sure of is highly 
visible: All men are mortal.  
 
These questions about the scope of the regularities of 
contemporary physics are a central concern of mine. Let 
me summarize one main line of thought. Physics is dense 
and highly interconnected; there’s nothing you can say 
that doesn’t have countless implications that themselves 
have implications, and so on. This is to a good extent 
why physics is so powerful. If you find out just the right 
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kind of information for your problem, that can have an 
amazing rich set of precise consequences. 
 
The drawback is that this thick set of interconnections 
places enormously strict constraints on when any 
particular physics concept can apply. This can very much 
narrow the scope of where these concepts do apply – and 
I think it does so. Not a whole lot of the world can satisfy 
these constraints. We have good evidence, for instance, 
that quantum constraints are satisfied in the material 
structure of superconductors, but little evidence that they 
can be satisfied for other kinds of macro-systems. As the 
Nobel prize-winning quantum physicist Willis Lamb has 
told us in lectures at LSE, it is very hard to get a system 
into a quantum state. 
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Those who believe in the universal scope of these laws 
have a familiar reply. What Lamb is talking about is the 
difficulty of getting a system into a known quantum 
state. All systems are always in quantum states – we just 
can’t ascertain them. Again, I am suspicious. I have 
positive evidence that a variety of kinds of systems can 
satisfy the constraints; I will await positive evidence 
before I believe the others can. 
 
To return to laws of Nature. Despite the fact that 
instrumentalism eschews laws, I think it provides the 
best fit between God and the laws of Nature. Suppose we 
admit God into either the empiricist or Platonist frame, in 
order to show how the laws can govern. We still wish to 
see that these laws are writ in the Book of nature. 
Regularities are essential to both the Platonist and the 
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empiricist account here. For the empiricist, laws are 
visible in Nature since laws just are regularities in 
Nature. For the Platonist, although the laws are in the 
Platonic realm, they are “mirrored” in Nature, again in 
Nature’s regularities. The whole picture does not work if 
these vaunted regularities are not there after all.  
 
Instrumentalism offers an alternative. God uses the 
‘laws’ of science in making things happen in the world in 
much the same way that we do, as an instrument for 
calculating what is to happen.  The laws are indeed writ 
in Nature but not in the questionable regularities of the 
empiricist or Platonist account. They are writ rather in 
the more complex, untidy particulars of everything that 
does in fact happen. 
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Aristotleanism. The last of the contemporary views about 
laws finds its source in Aristotle. Like instrumentalism, it 
does not suppose that there are laws of Nature. The laws 
of science describe the powers that systems in Nature 
have by virtue of certain facts about them.3 For instance, 
material systems, by virtue of having gravitational mass, 
have the power to attract any other system that has mass.  
 
This kind of view has long been out of fashion, 
especially among empiricists who take their cue from 
Hume and who altogether reject talk of powers, causings, 
makings and necessity in the empirical world. But it has 
not always been so with empiricists. Early British 
empiricists – before the spread of the Cartesian doctrine 
of ideas and long before Hume –  were committed to 
                                                 
3 For Aristotle, by virtue of their “Natures”. 
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basing science on what is given in experience. But this 
does not rule out powers, though it does make talk of 
them difficult for post-Lapsarian man. For instance 
Joseph Glanvill, apologist for the Mechanical 
Philosophy, tells us that Adam could see the exercise of 
powers: “…the influence of the Moon upon the Tides 
was no question in his Philosophy.”  
 
I endorse this kind of pre-Cartesisn/pre-Humean 
empiricism and I have spent a lot of effort trying to show 
that notions like powers and causings are not only 
compatible with an empiricist view of science but that 
we cannot make sense of science without them.  This is a 
long story. The one thing I should note here is that in the 
right circumstances powers can play themselves out in 
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regularities. But when the circumstances are not 
felicitous what happens may be highly variable. 
 
With respect to our central issue my major claim about 
Aristotleanism then is this: Aristotleanism rejects laws of 
Nature. But (if I and other recent advocates of powers in 
science are right in our claims about them) it can make 
sense of the laws of science in a way that respects the 
two requirements we placed on laws of nature 
(governance and visibily in Nature itself) and it can do so 
without God. On the Aristotle-inspired account, there is 
necessity and governance in Nature: natural systems 
have powers and events in Nature are made to occur in 
the way that they do by the exercise of these powers. The 
laws of science describe these powers. As in the case of 
instrumentalism, the results predicted from the laws of 
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science are indeed visible in Nature and without the need 
for hidden and secret regularities.  
 
Conclusion. None of the 4 contemporary accounts of 
laws that I have reported on can make sense of laws of 
Nature without God. The last, Aristotleanism, can offer a 
stand-in for laws – natural powers – that satisfies the 
major requirements on laws without the need to call on 
God.4  For those who cannot abide powers, I think there 
are no options left. Without God there cannot be laws of 
Nature, nor anything else with their crucial 
characteristics.  
 
 
    
 
                                                 
4 This does not of course have consequences one way or another for the prior question, “Is God necessary 
to create the material world with its powers?” 
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